Artificial intelligence and international conflict in cyberspace: Exploring three sets of issues

What is at stake with the use of automation in international conflict in cyberspace through AI? This introductory chapter outlines the main themes, objectives, and rationale of the volume with the ambition of delineating a comprehensive perspective on the relationship between AI and international conflict in cyberspace. It does so by introducing the three sets of issues around which the volume has been organised: (1) technical and operational, (2) strategic and geopolitical, and (3) normative and legal. By highlighting the main debates for each of these issues, this chapter also contextualises the volume’s contributions into broader debates about challenges and opportunities brought by AI technology. In so doing, the chapter argues that only by understanding the relationship between AI and conflict in cyberspace as a comprehensive phenomenon and embedded in broader geopolitical conflicts, can the international community truly move forward with meaningful regulation. In its concluding part, this chapter also draws a state-of-the-art account of how the debate on emerging technologies, and AI specifically, has (not) evolved in the context of the recent multilateral processes at the United Nations (GGE and OEWG)

Artificial Intelligence and International Conflict in Cyberspace

This edited volume explores how artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming international conflict in cyberspace. Over the past three decades, cyberspace developed into a crucial frontier and issue of international conflict. However, scholarly work on the relationship between AI and conflict in cyberspace has been produced along somewhat rigid disciplinary boundaries and an even more rigid sociotechnical divide – wherein technical and social scholarship are seldomly brought into a conversation. This is the first volume to address these themes through a comprehensive and cross-disciplinary approach. With the intent of exploring the question ‘what is at stake with the use of automation in international conflict in cyberspace through AI?’, the chapters in the volume focus on three broad themes, namely: (1) technical and operational, (2) strategic and geopolitical and (3) normative and legal. These also constitute the three parts in which the chapters of this volume are organised, although these thematic sections should not be considered as an analytical or a disciplinary demarcation

Natalizumab treatment shows low cumulative probabilities of confirmed disability worsening to EDSS milestones in the long-term setting.

Abstract Background Though the Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS) is commonly used to assess disability level in relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis (RRMS), the criteria defining disability progression are used for patients with a wide range of baseline levels of disability in relatively short-term trials. As a result, not all EDSS changes carry the same weight in terms of future disability, and treatment benefits such as decreased risk of reaching particular disability milestones may not be reliably captured. The objectives of this analysis are to assess the probability of confirmed disability worsening to specific EDSS milestones (i.e., EDSS scores ≥3.0, ≥4.0, or ≥6.0) at 288 weeks in the Tysabri Observational Program (TOP) and to examine the impact of relapses occurring during natalizumab therapy in TOP patients who had received natalizumab for ≥24 months. Methods TOP is an ongoing, open-label, observational, prospective study of patients with RRMS in clinical practice. Enrolled patients were naive to natalizumab at treatment initiation or had received ≤3 doses at the time of enrollment. Intravenous natalizumab (300 mg) infusions were given every 4 weeks, and the EDSS was assessed at baseline and every 24 weeks during treatment. Results Of the 4161 patients enrolled in TOP with follow-up of at least 24 months, 3253 patients with available baseline EDSS scores had continued natalizumab treatment and 908 had discontinued (5.4% due to a reported lack of efficacy and 16.4% for other reasons) at the 24-month time point. Those who discontinued due to lack of efficacy had higher baseline EDSS scores (median 4.5 vs. 3.5), higher on-treatment relapse rates (0.82 vs. 0.23), and higher cumulative probabilities of EDSS worsening (16% vs. 9%) at 24 months than those completing therapy. Among 24-month completers, after approximately 5.5 years of natalizumab treatment, the cumulative probabilities of confirmed EDSS worsening by 1.0 and 2.0 points were 18.5% and 7.9%, respectively (24-week confirmation), and 13.5% and 5.3%, respectively (48-week confirmation). The risks of 24- and 48-week confirmed EDSS worsening were significantly higher in patients with on-treatment relapses than in those without relapses. An analysis of time to specific EDSS milestones showed that the probabilities of 48-week confirmed transition from EDSS scores of 0.0–2.0 to ≥3.0, 2.0–3.0 to ≥4.0, and 4.0–5.0 to ≥6.0 at week 288 in TOP were 11.1%, 11.8%, and 9.5%, respectively, with lower probabilities observed among patients without on-treatment relapses (8.1%, 8.4%, and 5.7%, respectively). Conclusions In TOP patients with a median (range) baseline EDSS score of 3.5 (0.0–9.5) who completed 24 months of natalizumab treatment, the rate of 48-week confirmed disability worsening events was below 15%; after approximately 5.5 years of natalizumab treatment, 86.5% and 94.7% of patients did not have EDSS score increases of ≥1.0 or ≥2.0 points, respectively. The presence of relapses was associated with higher rates of overall disability worsening. These results were confirmed by assessing transition to EDSS milestones. Lower rates of overall 48-week confirmed EDSS worsening and of transitioning from EDSS score 4.0–5.0 to ≥6.0 in the absence of relapses suggest that relapses remain a significant driver of disability worsening and that on-treatment relapses in natalizumab-treated patients are of prognostic importance

State-sponsored cyber operations and international law

Defence date: 9 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Nehal Bhuta, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor Jean d’Aspremont, University of Manchester; Professor Marco Roscini, University of Westminster; Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler, European University Institute & New York UniversityThis doctoral dissertation investigates the wide range of conceptualizations and categorizations that are applicable to state-sponsored cyber operations. State-sponsored cyber operations, namely recourse to cyber means by one State against another, are generally labelled 'cyber warfare'. This is neither a legal nor a prescriptive term; it reflects, however, a disproportionate focus on the realm of warfare. Avoiding hasty or overly simplistic characterizations of situations as cyber warfare is important to avoid further deterioration of their relations leading potentially to military escalation. This dissertation defines state-sponsored cyber operations according to international law and demonstrates that the majority of these incidents fall outside of the realm of (cyber) warfare and, therefore, need to be addressed separately and approached differently. Most state-sponsored cyber operations do not actually violate the prohibition of the use of force or the law of armed conflict, but rather they impinge the territorial sovereignty of the targeted States, the principle of nonintervention, or human rights. Cyber warfare is only the tip of the iceberg. An entire world lies submerged: cyber operations below the threshold of cyber warfare. While the emerged part concerning cyber warfare is well-studied and widely known, this thesis endeavours to shed light on the submerged, and arguably bigger, part that has been understudied and is less known. Parts I and II map the circumstances in which state-sponsored cyber operations violate international law. They demonstrate inter alia that most cyber operations remain under the threshold of cyber warfare, while they may constitute a breach of territorial sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention or even human rights law in most cases. Part I also analyzes the duty of diligence of third States. Part III deals with the attribution of cyber operations, analysing the attribution to the machine, to the human perpetrator, and focusing more specifically on the attribution to the sponsoring State. Part IV focuses on the consequences of an internationally wrongful cyber operation, mainly the obligations deriving from the law of State responsibility, and the remedies to address it, notably the recourse to self-defence, retorsion and countermeasures

Civilian direct participation in cyber hostilities

This article studies the application of a well-known notion of international humanitarian law, civilian direct participation in hostilities, to cyber warfare. According to the principle of distinction, civilians and combatants must be distinguished in times of armed conflict. The shift of hostilities from the real world into cyberspace affects neither the definition of combatants nor the negative definition of civilians. However, beyond the classical approach of the principle of distinction, the changing character of warfare also concerns cyber warfare. Indeed, the distinction between battlefields and civilian areas is increasingly less clear and a rising number of non-combatants directly participate in hostilities in various ways. Cyber means, and the development of cyber warfare, offer numerous new possibilities for non-combatants who want to take part in hostilities. It has never been this easy for civilians to get involved in hostilities and most civilians are ignorant of the consequences of their actions. Recently, two groups of experts have released documents partly related to this topic with divergent conclusions: the first one is the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law adopted by the ICRC in 2009. The second one is the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare written at the behest of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As these documents differ in their approach to reading of the topic, part of this article will analyze their divergences

Cyber operations and international law

Awarded the 2021 European Society of International Law (ESIL) Book Prize during the 16th ESIL Annual Conference in Stockholm.This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the international law applicable to cyber operations, including a systematic examination of attribution, lawfulness and remedies. It demonstrates the importance of countermeasures as a form of remedies and also shows the limits of international law, highlighting its limits in resolving issues related to cyber operations. There are several situations in which international law leaves the victim State of cyber operations helpless. Two main streams of limits are identified. First, in the case of cyber operations conducted by non-state actors on the behalf of a State, new technologies offer various ways to coordinate cyber operations without a high level of organization. Second, the law of State responsibility offers a range of solutions to respond to cyber operations and seek reparation, but it does not provide an answer in every case and it cannot solve the problem related to technical capabilities of the victim.-- 1. Does international law matter in cyberspace? -- Part I: Attribution -- 2. Attribution to a machine or a human: a technical process -- 3. The Question of Evidence: From Technical to Legal Attribution -- 4. Attribution to a state -- Part II: The lawfulness of cyber operations -- 5. Internationally wrongful cyber acts: cyber operations breaching norms of international law -- 6. The threshold of cyber warfare: from use of cyber force to cyber armed attack -- 7. Circumstances precluding or attenuating the wrongfulness of unlawful cyber operations -- 8. Cyber operations and the principle of due diligence -- Part III: Remedies against state-sponsored cyber operations -- 9. State responsibility and the consequences of an internationally wrongful cyber operation -- 10. Measures of self-help against state-sponsored cyber operations -- 11. ConclusionPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 201

The French Twitter case : a difficult equilibrium between freedom of expression and its limits

The French Twitter case (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ordonnance de référé, 24 janv. 2013, n° 13/50262, n° 13/50276, UEJF et a. c/ Twitter Inc. et Sté Twitter France and Cour d’Appel de Paris, 12 June 2013, Twitter Inc. et Twitter France c/ UEJF et a.) shows the difficulties experienced by courts, national authorities and companies, in relation to an international activity, and to find an equilibrium between freedom of expression and its limits, notably in the respect of public order. Moreover, it also shows that in a significant number of cases on the Internet, the application of the French law depends on the goodwill of the companies or the authorities of a foreign state

Civilian Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities

<p class="ABSTRACTidp2014">This article studies the application of a well-known notion of international humanitarian law, civilian direct participation in hostilities, to cyber warfare.</p><p class="ABSTRACTidp2014">According to the principle of distinction, civilians and combatants must be distinguished in times of armed conflict. The shift of hostilities from the real world into cyberspace affects neither the definition of combatants nor the negative definition of civilians. However, beyond the classical approach of the principle of distinction, the changing character of warfare also concerns cyber warfare. Indeed, the distinction between battlefields and civilian areas is increasingly less clear and a rising number of non-combatants directly participate in hostilities in various ways. Cyber means, and the development of cyber warfare, offer numerous new possibilities for non-combatants who want to take part in hostilities. It has never been this easy for civilians to get involved in hostilities and most civilians are ignorant of the consequences of their actions.</p><p class="ABSTRACTidp2014">Recently, two groups of experts have released documents partly related to this topic with divergent conclusions: the first one is the <em>Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law</em> adopted by the ICRC in 2009. The second one is the <em>Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare</em> written at the behest of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. As these documents differ in their approach to reading of the topic, part of this article will analyze their divergences.</p&gt